9/11 Commission Report Summary (Chapter 1)

This is a summary of Chapter 1, "We Have Some Planes"

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Note: These summaries that I am writing consist of parts and passages that I think are important. I bring them to you attention because I think that they are vital information that I believe some people might not know. I guess that is all I have to say about that for the time being. Just keep it in mind.

The 9/11 Commission Report is broken up by chapters, then further separated by sub-chapters(e.g. 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and so on).

Chapter 1, 1.1 - INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS

This section of the Report takes you inside each of the hijacked flights (American 11 and United 175, which crashed into the World Trade Center; American 77 which crashed into the Pentagon; United 93 which crashed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania). It describes each of the hijackers, the security processes at the individual airports, and gives a blow-by-blow account of the hijackings.

I am not going to summarize this section because one can not really summarize what happened in each of the flights. I believe that it is important for everyone to read this part if they get a chance.

Chapter 1, 1.2 - IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE

The major characters in this section are the FAA (Federal Aviation Association) and NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command).

Basically, there was a complex system of protocol that was supposed to be followed in a case of hijacking. On 9/11, it was the first time that anyone had encountered hijackers who intended to use airplanes as weapons of mass destruction. Besides this, there had never been such an undertaken hijacking before, involving so many planes. There were also many problems with communications between different agencies. The list goes on and on, but that is the basic jist of it. I will now provide some quotations from the report that are relevant.

"On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen."

This was very true. As I said before, the chain of command protocol was very detailed, and would not possibly be able to accomadate such a situation as these agencies faced on 9/11.

"United 175 (second plane to crash into World Trade Center) turned southewest without clearance from air traffic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact of American 11, United 175's transponder code changed, and then changed again. These changes were not noticed for several minutes, however, because the same New York Center controller was assigned to both American 11 (the first plane to crash into the World Trade Center) and United 175. The controller knew American 11 was hijacked; he was focused on searching for it after the aircraft disappeared at 8:46."

This, of course, presented a big problem because the air controller was not able to discern what was happening on both hijacked planes. They do not say what caused this controller to be responsible for both planes, or if it was just a coincidence. However, since time was crucial in this situation, those several minutes that United 175 was not classified as hijacked made problems much worse.

"At about 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center manager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked. The manager tried to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing a hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed."

This was just another problem that did not help the situation. I think that we can all appreciate what they were doing, but ignoring another hijacked aircraft was not the answer.

"Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its controllers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New York and to advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Herndon Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide. We have found no evidence to suggest that the Commande Center acted on this request or issued any type of cockpit security alert."

There was a big problem with communication during 9/11, as you can see:

"The first indication that the NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, came in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03. The notice came at about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower."

"In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 (plane that crashed into the Pentagon) turn around. by the time it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped looking for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking toward the west. Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, neither it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding centers to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undectected for 36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C."

That's all I can do for right now. I will try and post more tomorrow. Please check back.